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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI: IS IT TIME FOR
BLIGHT AND BUT-FOR TO GO?

I. INTRODUCTION
Westfield America, Inc. (Westfield), a publicly-traded real estate
investment trust (REIT), owns significant interests in thirty-nine major U.S.
shopping centers known as “Westfield Shoppingtowns.”1 These
“Shoppingtowns,” which serve over ten percent of the U.S. population,
currently account for 35.6 million square feet of leased retail space and house
4800 specialty stores.2 Moreover, Westfield’s “Funds From Operations”
totaled more than $177 million in 1999, making Westfield one of the largest
REITs engaged in the shopping center leasing business.3
In 1997, Westfield acquired West County Center shopping mall in Des
Peres, Missouri, the second wealthiest municipality in the St. Louis area.4
Soon after acquiring West County Center, Westfield announced a $200 million
redevelopment plan for the mall.5 The planned development would double the
shopping center’s size to approximately 1.2 million square feet and add
upscale shopping stores such as Lord & Taylor and Nordstrom as anchor
tenants.6 Westfield sought public financing assistance for the West County
Center project from the City of Des Peres in the form of tax increment
financing (TIF).7
1. WESTFIELD AMERICA, INC., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2000), available at
http://www.westfieldamerica.com.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 33. “Funds From Operations” is defined as net income (loss), excluding gains (or
losses) from debt restructuring and sales of property, plus real estate related depreciation and
amortization and after adjustments for unconsolidated real estate affiliates. “Funds From
Operations” does not directly equate with net profit. Id.
4. Dan Mihalopoulos & Fred Faust, West County Center Pushes to be Declared Blighted,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 1997 (Zone West), at A1. Des Peres was the second
wealthiest suburban St. Louis municipality, after Ladue, based on figures for median income and
residential property value. The median income of Des Peres residents was $74,901 in 1994 and its
average residential property value exceeded $173,000. Id.
5. Linda Billingsly, Hearing Set on Mall’s Rebuilding Panel Will Tackle 3 Key Questions,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 1997 (Zone West), at A1.
6. See Mihalopoulos & Faust, supra note 4. The Nordstrom’s would be the first built in the
St. Louis area. Id.
7. Id. It was not unexpected for Westfield to request TIF funds for the mall. In states with
TIF, nearly all cities with populations over 50,000 use TIF in some fashion. Jeffrey I. Chapman,
1019
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TIF, a statutory mechanism permitting public financing of private
redevelopment projects, is common for large-scale redevelopment projects
such as Westfield’s West County Center initiative.8 Specifically, TIF works by
permitting incremental tax revenues—i.e., the additional taxes generated by the
redevelopment itself—to be diverted from traditional taxing jurisdictions, such
as school districts and police and fire departments, to defray up-front costs of
the project.9 This fiscal bootstrapping technique unique to TIF is enormously
popular with municipal governments seeking to finance real estate
development without raising general taxes or withdrawing existing tax
revenues from traditional taxing jurisdictions.10
By statute, however, TIF is restricted to certain types of development.11
Most importantly, TIF is limited to projects that will eradicate blight or, in the
alternative, halt the advance of blight.12 Therefore, in Missouri as well as most
other states, TIF statutes call for the municipality’s governing body to meet
certain tests prior to authorizing TIF.13 The municipality must issue findings
that “the redevelopment area on the whole is a blighted area, a conservation
area, or an economic development area” (the “blighting test”) and that the
redevelopment area “has not been subject to growth and development through
investment by private enterprise and would not reasonably be anticipated to be
developed without the adoption of tax increment financing” (the “but-for”
test).14 These tests, coupled with an array of procedural requirements, form the
heart of Missouri’s TIF statute and are the principal tests required of any
municipality to proceed with the use of TIF on a redevelopment initiative.

Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND
USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998).
8. Gary H. Feder, Recent Trends and Municipal Government Perspectives, in MAJOR LAND
USE LAWS IN MISSOURI 63 (1999). One commentator stated: “[I]n most instances today in this
region, market forces alone do not support the [redevelopment] project. Except for rare instances,
all projects receive some form of assistance.” Michael Lazaroff, Remarks at the St. Louis
Regional Economic Forecast (Oct. 15, 1999), in ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Oct. 22, 1999, at 95, available
at 1999 WL 24027263.
9. SAM CASELLA, AMERICAN PLANNING ASS’N, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: WHAT IS
TIF? 1 (1984). For a fuller discussion of the workings of TIF, see infra text accompanying notes
60-118.
10. Id.
11. See JIM CULOTTA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING: AN ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING TECHNIQUE 1 (2000).
12. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (Supp. 1998). The area must be either a “blighted area” or
an area that is not yet blighted, but is still “detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare, and may become a blighted area.” Id. § 99.805(3).
13. See id. § 99.810.
14. Id. § 99.810(1). For a more complete description of the “blighting test” and for
definitions of what constitutes blighted areas, conservation areas and economic development
areas, see infra text accompanying notes 111-117.
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In the West County Center situation, the Des Peres Board of Aldermen
declared that West County Center was “blighted” and met the requirements of
the but-for test.15 Based on these findings, Des Peres ultimately approved
$28.9 million in TIF for Westfield’s proposed redevelopment.16 The decision
to award the TIF funds precipitated a maelstrom of controversy in the St. Louis
area.17 Opponents derided the project as an unnecessary giveaway to deeppocketed developers,18 and legislators grappled with overhauling TIF’s
statutory framework in response to the perceived misuse of TIF on projects
such as West County Center.19
In fact, certain Des Peres residents, together with The Jacobs Group, the
owner of a rival mall in suburban St. Louis, sued the City of Des Peres based
on the Westfield TIF.20 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
invalidating the ordinances passed by Des Peres which authorized the
development and an injunction preventing Des Peres from utilizing TIF on the
project.21 The plaintiffs argued that West County Center could not rationally
be declared “blighted” when the mall had near 100% occupancy and annual
sales topped $100 million, and that the subsidizing of the mall through TIF
funds amounted to unfair competition.22 Plaintiffs also argued that Westfield,
“one of the largest shopping center owners in the world,” had the economic
ability to complete the redevelopment project without public subsidy.23 The
15. Dan Mihalopoulos, West County Center Expansion Wins Approval, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1997, at C1.
16. Id. Westfield initially requested more than $50 million in TIF for the project. Id.
17. See, e.g., Editorial, Time To End TIF Giveaway, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 24,
1997, at B6; Kenneth P. Thomas, Editorial, Without Reform, Tax Increment Financing Makes No
Sense, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2000, at B7.
18. See Time To End TIF Giveaway, supra note 17. This editorial labeled the TIF to
Westfield a “dubious handout.” But see Andrew Morris, Editorial, True Meaning of TIFs, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 1997, at 36.
19. See Phil Sutin, A Group of Area Lawmakers Sets Aside Political Differences to Forge
Unity on Regional Goals, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 10, 2000, at B1. The effort to
statutorily limit TIF is ongoing. Proposals have focused on limiting TIF to areas of pervasive
poverty or high unemployment. However, these proposals have not achieved the necessary
consensus among state lawmakers. The primary problem with the legislative proposals thus far is
that the proposals would limit TIF to “narrowly defined pockets without inadvertently excluding
other areas needing (tax increment financing) to overcome development obstacles.” Id. In light
of the legislative impasse, this Comment suggests an alternative method to reforming Missouri’s
TIF statute that would not limit TIF to only certain municipalities.
20. William C. Lhotka, One Mall Challenges Another’s Use of TIF Money, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, July 26, 1998, at D1. See also John Gibeaut, The Money Chase: Municipalities Love
Using Tax Breaks to Lure New Businesses, But Sweetheart Deals Have Lawyers for School
Districts and Industry Rivals Raising Red Flags, 85 A.B.A. J. 58, 61 (March 1999).
21. JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres, No. ED77037, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2,
at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001).
22. Id. at *4. See also Gibeaut, supra note 20, at 61.
23. Lhotka, supra note 20.
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suit, apparently the first of its kind in the United States, “stunned” certain
municipal law experts.24
However, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the TIF
subsidy.25 On appeal, the decision was affirmed.26 In its opinion, the Missouri
Court of Appeals noted that while “it is illogical to label as an economic
liability a commercial enterprise that is indisputably [the] City’s greatest
economic asset,” the court was unwilling to strike down the allocation of TIF
dollars by the municipality to the developer on legal grounds.27 Emphasizing
that it would not interfere with the “fairly debatable” legislative decision made
by Des Peres’ Board of Aldermen, the court thus allowed Westfield to proceed
with the redevelopment of the shopping mall with the TIF subsidy.28
This Comment argues that rules of statutory construction and
considerations of public policy—namely, judicial deference to matters of
municipal policy-making—propelled the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West
L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres. In other words, the outcome in JG St. Louis West
was a predictable one, beginning with TIF’s expansive statutory language and
solidified by long-standing policies mandating judicial deference to
“legislative decisions” made at the local level. However, while the court’s
decision makes sense in light of these principles, this Comment argues that the
TIF statute, and by implication the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West, has
eliminated traditional and even common-sense notions of blight that are more
logical and intuitive than the current blighting and but-for tests. To correct this
situation, this Comment advocates discarding the blighting and but-for tests
completely, or, alternatively, replacing these tests with a more intuitive,
rational standard befitting the current conception of TIF as an all-purpose
development tool. In conjunction with aligning TIF with its broad present-day
purposes, this Comment also advocates providing additional subsidies or
incentives to the urban “slum” areas that TIF was originally intended to help
but largely failed to reach.
In light of this argument, this Comment is divided into seven sections,
including this Introduction. Section II provides a brief history of TIF, focusing

24. Id.
25. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *1. However, the circuit court judge
suggested that the use of TIF in conjunction with the Shoppingtown’s renovation could be “bad
public policy.” Dan Mihalopoulos, A Winner is Declared in Suburban Mall War, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1999, at E1. Specifically, the judge stated: “The court has limited and,
in this court’s judgment, inadequate authority to test . . . the appropriateness of the actions . . . of
the Board of Aldermen, when that board acts seemingly as a bank board of directors, as opposed
to acting as a legislative body with police powers.” William C. Lhotka, Judge OK’s West County
Center Subsidy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 1999, at A1.
26. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *21.
27. Id. at *8.
28. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI

1023

on the evolution of TIF from a fairly limited redevelopment tool for the
removal of “urban slum” conditions to an all-purpose economic development
engine. Section III examines the basic structure and workings of TIF, first
looking at TIF’s mechanical operation, and then examining the requirements of
Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Development Act.29
Section IV looks at the advantages and disadvantages of TIF, from both
developer and the municipal perspectives.. Section V provides an overview of
Missouri case law dealing with “blighting” statutes, focusing on the JG St.
Louis West decision. Finally, Section VI provides an explanation of the forces
driving the outcome of the recent TIF litigation, and considers two alternative
avenues for legislative reform—either dropping the blighting and but-for tests
completely, or revising the tests into a more workable, intellectually honest
approach.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
States have employed TIF for nearly forty years for a wide variety of
development projects.30 However, in TIF’s early years, it was used for fairly
limited purposes: the clearance and rehabilitation of urban decay in downtown
areas.31 Only in the past twenty years, due to changing economic conditions
and increasing reliance on business subsidies, has TIF become an all-purpose
economic development tool.32
California was the first state to legislate TIF in 1952.33 TIF was instituted
in California after voters failed to approve a local match for federal urban
renewal funds.34 Local officials, seeking alternative methods to tap into the
29. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800–.865 (1994).
30. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 182.
31. Id. See also CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 1.
32. This, in turn, has lead TIF to be more closely scrutinized by legal scholars proposing a
wide range of solutions to perceived TIF abuses. See, e.g., Julie A. Goshorn, Note, In A TIF:
Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (1999) (arguing
that TIF abuse by municipalities and developers could be curbed by statutory amendments that
limit TIF to areas of “pervasive poverty” or high crime); Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious
Development: Tax Increment Financing and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV.
LITIG. 145 (1998) (arguing that compelled transfers of land via eminent domain for the purpose
of redevelopment—in conjunction with TIF—constitutes “economically motivated
condemnation” lacking a public purpose); Catherine Michel, Note, Brother, Can You Spare a
Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457 (1996) (arguing that legislative
reform is necessary to make TIF more responsive to community interests); Joseph F. Luther,
Comment, Tax Increment Financing: Municipalities Avoiding Voter Accountability, DETROIT
C.L. REV. 89 (1987) (arguing that TIF violates certain states’ constitutional provisions concerning
voter approval of new municipal debt).
33. KENNETH HUBBELL & PETER J. EATON, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC INFORMATION,
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE STATE OF
MISSOURI 1 (1997).
34. Chapman, supra note 7, at 190.
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federal funds, devised TIF as a substitute method of obtaining the local match.
However, officials recognized that the viability of TIF as a financing
mechanism continued even after the federal programs were completed.35
Therefore, California development authorities experimented with TIF in
conjunction with other, privately financed property redevelopment projects.36
California’s success with TIF on these projects led many other states to adopt
the TIF mechanism.37
California and other states initially utilized TIF in a conservative fashion.38
TIF projects were generally not speculative in nature, but rather were based on
pre-existing tax flows.39 Moreover, nearly all states with TIF were using TIF
solely in urban slum areas clearly meeting the statutory requirements of the
blighting and but-for tests.40 TIF was used in these urban areas in a
predictable, straightforward manner for the construction of commercial and
retail business spaces and also for low-income housing projects.41
However, political and economic pressures, and increasing reliance on
business incentives to capture business activity, forced cities to experiment
with broader applications of TIF.42 Business interests increasingly viewed
TIF, along with other development incentives, as a necessity for certain types
Moreover, federal economic
of large-scale redevelopment projects.43
development funds were eliminated in the 1970s and 1980s, forcing cities with
aging commercial and residential infrastructures to find creative financing
methods to entice new development.44 Under these conditions, TIF was

35. Id.
36. See George Lefcoe, When Governments Become Land Developers: Notes on the PublicSector Experience in the Netherlands and California, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 165, 172 (1978).
37. Indeed, by 1994, TIF was being utilized by 5400 agencies in forty-four states. Chapman,
supra note 7, at 184. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4-2 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-714-1 (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.19 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1770
(1992).
38. DAVID A. WILCOX & DAVID E. VERSEL, ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, REVIEW
OF BEST PRACTICES FOR TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1999) (on file
with the Saint Louis University Law Journal).
39. Id. In other words, the incremental taxes were in some sense “guaranteed” by the
federally funded projects. For a fuller discussion of debt instruments in relation to TIF, see infra
text accompanying notes 67-74.
40. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 2.
41. Chapman, supra note 7, at 182.
42. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 2.
43. See HUBBELL & EATON, supra note 33, at 1.
44. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 1; see also JOHN BRANCAGLIONE & CAROL LEVINSON,
NATIONAL BUSINESS INSTITUTE, THE MYTH AND REALITY OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 75
(1999).
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viewed as one of the few remaining effective tools available to municipalities
seeking to jump-start property redevelopment.45
As TIF became a more recognized and all-inclusive development tool, and
federal subsidies continued to wither, states sought to enhance TIF’s
flexibility. For instance, the traditional funding mechanism of TIF was
broadened in many states to include other community tax bases as well as
property taxes.46 Thus, local governments were allowed to earmark local sales
taxes, earning taxes, and other business revenues, along with property taxes, as
the “incremental tax revenues” available to fund TIF projects.47 This, in turn,
allowed TIF to be utilized on a wider variety of projects, including commercial
retail projects, which generate significant sales tax revenue.48
Clearly, by the 1990s TIF was something of an all-purpose developmental
tool. In fact, TIF was increasingly viewed not only as a device for the removal
of blight, but rather, as a tool capable of eliminating “fiscal stress” placed upon
urban and suburban municipalities.49 Fiscal stress results from financial
obligations incurred by municipalities seeking to provide costly services,
including police protection, trash removal, and infrastructure improvements, to
residents and businesses.50 Faced with mounting fiscal stress, municipalities
recognized that TIF would be one way to finance new development or
redevelopment without raising general taxes or expending additional out-ofpocket funds.51
Missouri enacted its TIF statute, the Real Property Tax Increment
Allocation Redevelopment Act,52 in 1982. Missouri’s statute is substantially
similar to statutes found in many other states, and resulted in over 100 TIF
redevelopment districts.53 These TIF districts are mainly concentrated in
Missouri’s metropolitan areas.54 For instance, as of August 2000, Kansas City

45. See Marc Jolin et al., Tax Increment Financing: Urban Renewal of the 1990s, 32
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 81, 83 (1998); see also Tim Fischesser, Editorial, Effort to Reform TIF
Could Hurt St. Louis City and County, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 1, 2000, at B7.
46. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 2.
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text for additional discussion of this point.
49. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 186.
50. Id. Cities gauge fiscal stress in relation to the experiences of other municipalities.
Chapman states: “It is also evident that some jurisdictions are more fiscally stressed than others.
While ‘unstressed’ jurisdictions may consistently run budget surpluses, others are continually
dipping into contingency accounts, borrowing from separate funds, instituting an array of new
fees and charges, dramatically reducing services, or allowing public infrastructure to deteriorate.”
Id.
51. Id.
52. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800–.865 (1994).
53. Dan Mihalopoulos, TIF Laws Bring Blight to Affluent Areas, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
April 8, 1997, at A1.
54. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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established thirty-seven TIF districts.55 St. Louis has established more than
forty such districts.56 Also, the use of TIF in Missouri has increased sharply in
recent years.57 For instance, in Kansas City, seven TIF plans were approved
between 1982 and 1991, but eighteen plans were approved between 1992 and
1997.58 Based on these figures, it is clear that TIF is continuing to expand in
Missouri.59
III. THE BASICS OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
A.

The TIF Mechanism—“Freezing,” PILOTs, EAV and EATS

As mentioned earlier, TIF enables a municipality to use additional
incremental tax revenues generated by a development project to finance the
upfront costs of the development itself.60 Specifically, TIF is set in motion
when a municipality acts to “freeze” the tax values on a subject property or
contiguous areas at a pre-development level—the initial “equalized assessed
value” (EAV).61 Taxes paid up to the EAV are still collected and paid to the
appropriate taxing jurisdictions, such as the school district or police district.62
Thus, these taxing jurisdictions are not deprived of any revenue per se, in that
they receive the same amount apportioned to them prior to the redevelopment
project.63 On the other hand, taxes collected above the initial EAV resulting
from the improvements to the property, i.e., the incremental taxes, are paid into
a Special Allocation Fund established by the municipality.64 The taxes paid

55. OFFICE OF THE CITY AUDITOR, CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, PERFORMANCE
AUDIT: REVIEW OF THE 1999 TIF ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2000) (on file with the Saint Louis
University Law Journal) [hereinafter 2000 PERFORMANCE AUDIT].
56. Mihalopoulos, supra note 53.
57. OFFICE OF THE CITY AUDITOR, CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, PERFORMANCE
AUDIT: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 5 (1998) (on file with the Saint Louis University Law
Journal) [hereinafter 1998 PERFORMANCE AUDIT].
58. Id.
59. TIF is gaining in popularity in other states as well. For instance, in Illinois, over 300 TIF
districts have been established. Michael T. Peddle, TIF in Illinois: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 441 (1997). Nearly sixty percent were instituted after 1987. Id.
In California, the tax increment was $400 million in 1984-85. By 1992-93, however, the
increment had tripled to $1.5 billion. Chapman, supra note 7, at 190-91.
60. See Feder, supra note 8, at 63.
61. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.855 (1994).
62. Chapman, supra note 7, at 183.
63. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.855.1 (1994).
64. Id. § 99.805(15) (Supp. 1998). The “Special Allocation Fund” is defined as “the fund of
a municipality or its commission which contains at least two separate segregated accounts for
each redevelopment plan, maintained by the treasurer of the municipality or the treasurer of the
commission into which payments in lieu of taxes are deposited in one account, and economic
activity taxes and other revenues are deposited in the other account.” Id.
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into the Special Allocation Fund are known as “payments in lieu of taxes”
(PILOTs), as they do not specifically constitute tax payments.65
In almost every case, municipalities will issue bonds for a TIF project and
use the funds generated by the bond issue to pay off the project’s up-front
development costs.66 In turn, the money in the Special Allocation Fund (made
as PILOTs) is generally used to pay off principal and interest on the bond
issue.67 Primarily, revenue bonds are issued in conjunction with TIF.68 Under
a revenue bond financing arrangement, the revenue generated by the project
itself would serve as security for the bonds.69 Like most other states, Missouri
does not allow for general obligation bonds to be issued for TIF projects.70
General obligation bonds are bonds secured by the “full faith and credit” of the
issuing municipality and therefore represent an additional risk to the issuing
municipality, because if incremental taxes are insufficient to pay off the
65. Id. § 99.805(10). Payments in lieu of taxes are specifically defined as:
[T]hose estimated revenues from real property in the area selected for a redevelopment
project, which revenues according to the redevelopment project or plan are to be used for
a private use, which taxing districts would have received had a municipality not adopted
tax increment allocation financing, and which would result from levies made after the
time of the adoption of tax increment allocation financing during the time the current
equalized value of real property in the area selected for the redevelopment project exceeds
the total initial equalized value of real property in such area until the designation is
terminated pursuant to subsection 2 of section 99.850.
Id.
66. See CASELLA, supra note 9, at 1. To gain credibility in the bond market, it may be
necessary for the municipality to show some guarantee that it will generate a substantial enough
increment to cover principal and interest costs of bonds. Of course, at the time of the issuance of
the bonds, there would likely be no increment because the project has not reached fruition.
Therefore, the developers or the municipality may have to dedicate funds to “jump start” the
project and lend credibility to their efforts. Chapman, supra note 7, at 184.
67. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.850 (1994). Chapman deems TIF to be “self-financing” at
least to a certain extent: “The increment in land value generates the revenue to pay for the debt
that was used to finance the expenditures that helped to cause the increment in land value.”
Chapman, supra note 7, at 184.
68. See MO. REV. STAT. §99.835 (Supp. 1998). Revenue bonds are “tax-exempt, long-term
obligations issued by public bodies.” M. DAVID GELFAND & PETER W. SALSICH, JR., STATE AND
LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 154 (1985).
69. GELFAND & SALSICH, supra note 68, at 155. Revenue bonds are not backed by the
taxing authority of the municipality, and they are generally payable through revenues generated
on specific projects financed by the bonds. Id. at 154.
70. MO. REV. STAT. §99.835.5 states:
The obligations issued pursuant to sections 99.800 to 99.865 shall not be a general
obligation of the municipality, county, state of Missouri, or any political subdivision
thereof, nor in any event shall such obligation be payable out of any funds or properties
other than those specifically pledged as security therefor. The obligations shall not
constitute indebtedness within the meaning of any constitutional, statutory or charter debt
limitation or restriction.
Id.
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principal and interest of the bond, the city must find additional revenue sources
or risk default.71
Municipalities, however, are not limited to bond financing arrangements.
In the alternative, municipalities may use their own funds to pay the
preliminary costs of development.72 Thus, the municipality may access
general governmental funds, economic development funds, municipal utility
funds, or federal grant funds to finance the TIF project. In this case the tax
increment generated by the project is then used to repay the loan from the
municipality’s funds.73 Also, “pay as you go” arrangements may be made
between the city and developer.74 With this type of financing, developers
obtain their own project financing and pay for development costs. The city
then uses tax increments to reimburse the developer for these up-front costs.
Therefore, the developer bears the risk if the increment is insufficient to repay
the costs incurred on the project.75
When utilizing a bond financing scheme or other type of loan arrangement
in conjunction with TIF, the redevelopment must quickly generate incremental
taxes large enough to service the principal and interest payments on the bond
issue or loan.76 However, if the increment is smaller than expected, default is
generally considered to be the option of last resort. Prior to taking this step,
the municipality may either reduce its expenditures in other project areas, or
utilize intragovernmental grants or other interest income to service the debt.77
TIF is also flexible in that it allows municipalities to defray a wide variety
of up-front development costs. TIF funds may be used to acquire property or
structures, demolish or remove obsolete structures, install utilities or other
public site improvements, or construct streets.78 TIF may also be used to pay
off various miscellaneous costs, such as economic and environmental studies,
engineering surveys, building plans and specifications and master planning
documents.79 TIF funds, however, cannot be used to directly finance the

71. GELFAND & SALSICH, supra note 68, at 143.
72. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(8) (Supp. 1998) (defining “obligations” as “bonds, loans,
debentures, notes, special certificates, or other evidences of indebtedness issued by a municipality
to carry out a redevelopment project or refund outstanding obligations”).
73. See id.
74. See MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, What is Tax Increment
Financing?, at http://www.mcda.org/Org/factsheets/taxincrementfinancing.htm.
75. Id.
76. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 185.
77. Id.
78. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(14) (listing the typical costs associated with TIF). See
also NATIONAL BUSINESS INSTITUTE, MAJOR LAND USE LAWS IN MISSOURI 134-35 (1998).
Mary B. Schultz authored this article.
79. Schultz, supra note 78, at 135.
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private interests of the developer (i.e., by allowing the developer to purchase
equipment, or by contributing to his profit).80
As noted earlier, TIF traditionally acted to “freeze” only the property taxes
within the TIF district. However, under the Missouri statute, fifty percent of
any new local Economic Activity Taxes (EATS), such as local sales taxes,
earnings taxes, or utility taxes generated from the project may also be paid into
the Special Allocation Fund.81 This greatly expands the uses of TIF, especially
for commercial retail projects such as shopping malls and strip mall centers,
which generate significant sales taxes. TIF projects located within an
Enterprise Zone, Federal Empowerment Zone or the Central Business District
may also tap fifty percent of the “new state revenue” generated by the
project.82
B.

Procedural Requirements of the TIF-Enabling Statute

Under Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment
Act, municipalities are subject to a host of procedural requirements that must
be met prior to enacting a TIF project. These requirements create a procedural
mechanism for municipalities to follow in enacting TIF plans and serve as a
safeguard against the misuse of TIF.
1.

The Redevelopment Plan

Generally, the authorization of a TIF redevelopment project begins with
the municipality commissioning urban planning experts to prepare a written
Redevelopment Plan.83 The Redevelopment Plan must set forth numerous
details of the project, including its objectives, estimated costs, anticipated
sources of funding, evidence of financial commitments acquired, anticipated
type and terms of the bond obligations to be issued by the municipality or
development authority, and the most recent EAV of the property and estimates
of the incremental taxes which are expected to be generated.84 The
Redevelopment Plan must also contain a cost-benefit analysis illustrating the
economic impact of the plan on affected taxing jurisdictions, the impact on the
municipal economy if the plan is not undertaken and “sufficient information

80. See CASELLA, supra note 9, at 5.
81. St. Louis Development Corp., Tax Benefit Programs: Tax Increment Financing (TIF), at
http://stlouis.missouri.org/sldc/busdev/tif.html. See also MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(4).
82. St. Louis Development Corp., supra note 81. This applies to TIF projects initiated after
January 1, 1998. Id.
83. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.1.
84. Id. The Redevelopment Plan must also include findings that the “blighting” and “but for”
tests, described infra in text accompanying notes 112-117, are met. Furthermore, the
Redevelopment Plan must “confor[m] to the comprehensive plan for the development of the
municipality as a whole.” Id. §99.810(2).
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from the developer . . . to evaluate whether the project proposed is financially
feasible.”85
2.

The TIF Commission

In conjunction with the Redevelopment Plan, the municipality is required
to establish a TIF Commission consisting of nine, eleven or twelve persons.86
Appointments to the TIF Commission are made by the chief elected officer of
the municipality, the school boards, the other affected taxing districts, and, at
times, the county in which the TIF district is located.87 Specifically, the chief
elected officer of the municipality appoints six members of the TIF
Commission, subject to the consent of the majority of the municipality’s
governing board.88 The affected school board appoints two members to the
TIF Commission, and the other affected taxing jurisdictions appoint one
member.89 The county appoints three members to the TIF commission where a
twelve-person TIF commission is established.90 The members of the TIF
commission appointed by the municipality serve a fixed term, but the members
appointed by the school district and other affected taxing jurisdictions may
either serve a fixed term or a term coinciding with the length of time of the
redevelopment project.91

85. Id. § 99.810(5). The financial analysis should also show “the impact on the economy if
the project is not built, and is built pursuant to the redevelopment plan under consideration.” Id.
86. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.2. Specifically, the statute reads:
[P]rior to adoption of an ordinance approving the designation of a redevelopment area or
approving a redevelopment plan or redevelopment project, the municipality shall create a
commission of nine persons if the municipality is a county or a city not within a county
and not a first class county with a charter form of government with a population in excess
of nine hundred thousand, and eleven persons if the municipality is not a county and not
in a first class county with a charter form of government having a population of more than
nine hundred thousand, and twelve persons if the municipality is located in or is a first
class county with a charter form of government having a population of more than nine
hundred thousand . . . .”
Id.
87. Id. § 99.820.2(1)-(6).
88. Id. § 99.820.2(3).
89. Id. § 99.820.2(1)-(2). Where there is an eleven-person TIF commission, the two
additional appointments are made by the county of the municipality. Where there is a twelveperson TIF commission—i.e., a municipality located in a first class county with a charter form of
government and having a population in excess of nine hundred thousand—the three additional
appointments are made by the county of the municipality. Id. § 99.820.2(4)-(6).
90. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.2(6) (Supp. 1998).
91. See id. § 99.820.2(7). Specifically, “of the members first appointed by the municipality,
two shall be designated to serve for terms of two years, two shall be designated to serve for a term
of three years and two shall be designated to serve for a term of four years . . . .” Id.
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The TIF commission is given broad powers to effectuate the
redevelopment project.92 Generally speaking, the commission will give notice
regarding the Plan and carry out public hearings related to the Plan.93 Also,
within thirty days of the public hearings on the Redevelopment Plan, the TIF
Commission must vote on the Plan and make recommendations to the city’s
governing body.94 The TIF Commission may also be called on by the
municipal board periodically to review the status of the redevelopment project
area.95
3.

Public Hearing Requirements

The statute requires that the TIF Commission hold public hearings on the
proposed Redevelopment Plan.96 The TIF notice requirements related to the
public hearings are fairly strict to ensure that the interested parties and the
public are made aware of the Redevelopment Plan. Notice must be given to all
interested parties by mail or publication.97 Notice by publication must be
given twice—once within thirty days of the hearing and again within ten
days.98 Notices must also be sent by certified mail to all persons who paid
general property taxes on parcels of property within the affected
redevelopment district.99 The notices must include the following: the meeting
time and place, the proposed project boundaries, a description of the proposed
redevelopment, a notice of where the Redevelopment Plan may be viewed, and
a statement that all parties attending the public hearing will have an
opportunity to be heard.100 At the hearing, the public is given a chance to
comment on the proposed plan, voice concerns and give additional
feedback.101
4.

Municipal Approval and Ordinances

Within ninety days of the public hearing, and after receiving a
recommendation from the TIF Commission that the Redevelopment Plan be
approved, the municipality’s governing board—generally, its board of
92. See id. § 99.820.3.
93. Id.
94. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.3 (Supp. 1998).
95. See id. § 99.810.2.
96. Id. § 99.830.1.
97. Id. Where notice is given by mail, it must be made by certified mail addressed to “the
person or persons in whose name the general taxes for the last preceding year were paid on each
lot, block, tract, or parcel of land lying within the redevelopment project or redevelopment
area . . . .” Id.
98. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.830.1 (Supp. 1998).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 99.830.2(1)-(4).
101. Id. § 99.825.1. Written objections to the plan may be filed, or, alternatively, oral
comments may be given. Id.
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aldermen—must decide whether it will put the Redevelopment Plan into
effect.102 If the board chooses to do so, it must adopt ordinances approving the
Redevelopment Plan and designating the redevelopment area.103 After
approving such ordinances, the municipality is authorized to “[m]ake and enter
into all contracts necessary or incidental to the implementation and furtherance
of its redevelopment plan or project.”104 Thereafter, the municipality may
purchase or lease the subject project, or, alternatively, acquire the property by
eminent domain. More commonly, however, the developer will already own
the property or act to purchase it.105 After the acquisition of the property is
finalized, the municipality, acting in conjunction with the developer, may
proceed with the preparation of the property for development.106 By statute,
the municipality is given the power to use all means “reasonably necessary to
achieve the objectives of the redevelopment plan.”107
5.

Ongoing Compliance

Generally speaking, the municipality periodically will review the TIF
districts under its authority to ensure compliance with state regulations.
Specifically, the municipality will look to make sure that its bond debt is being
retired in a timely fashion. Under the Missouri statute, the TIF bonds must be
retired within twenty-three years.108 When the debt is fully retired, the tax
assessments are “unfrozen” and the totality of the incremental tax revenues are
returned to the traditional taxing jurisdictions.109 Of course, the TIF project, if
successful, will result in a considerably higher tax base than before the
redevelopment project began.110

102. Id. § 99.820.1(1).
103. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.1(1). Also, section 99.830(1) provides that “no redevelopment
project shall be approved unless a redevelopment plan has been approved and a redevelopment
area has been designated prior to or concurrently with the approval of such redevelopment
project . . . .”
104. Id. § 99.820.1(2) (Supp. 1998).
105. Id. § 99.820.1(3). Specifically, the municipality may “acquire by purchase, donation,
lease or eminent domain, own, convey, lease, mortgage, or dispose of, land or other property, real
or personal, or rights or interests therein, and grant or acquire licenses, easements and options
with respect thereto . . .” Id.
106. Id. § 99.820(4).
107. Id. § 99.820(3). In fact, TIF often goes hand in hand with eminent domain. See Rogers,
supra note 32, at 167.
108. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810(3). However, in certain circumstances the debt can be
refinanced and the length of the project extended. Chapman, supra note 7, at 184.
109. Chapman, supra note 7, at 184.
110. Id.
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C. Substantive Requirements of the TIF-Enabling Statute
In contrast to the host of procedural requirements that must be satisfied for
a municipality to use TIF, the enabling statute requires only two substantive
tests to be met.111 Specifically, the statute calls for the municipality to issue
findings in its Redevelopment Plan that the proposed redevelopment has met
the requirements of the blighting test and the but-for test. The requirements of
each test will be examined in turn.
1.

The Blighting Test

A common misunderstanding of TIF is that it can only be used in
conjunction with “blighted” properties. In fact, to meet the requirements of the
so-called blighting test, the municipality must issue findings in its
Redevelopment Plan that “the redevelopment area on the whole is either a
‘blighted area,’ a ‘conservation area,’ or an ‘economic development area.’”112
A blighted area is defined by the statute as any area:
By reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout,
unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, improper
subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger
life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors,
retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or
social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its
present condition and use.113

A conservation area, on the other hand, is defined as any area:
[I]n which fifty percent or more of the structures in the area have an age of
thirty-five years or more. Such an area is not yet a blighted area but is
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and may become a
blighted area because of any one or more of the following factors: dilapidation;
obsolescence; deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of
structures below minimum code standards; abandonment; excessive vacancies;
overcrowding of structures and community facilities; lack of ventilation, light
or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land coverage; deleterious
land use or layout; depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of
community planning.114

111. The distinction between “procedural tests” and “substantive tests” within TIF’s enabling
statute is this author’s interpretation of the statute. The statute itself does not break the
requirements into these terms.
112. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.1(1).
113. Id. § 99.805(1).
114. Id. § 99.805(3) (Supp. 1998). A conservation area “shall meet at least three of the
factors provided in this subdivision for projects approved on or after December 23, 1997.” Id.
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Finally, an economic development area is defined as an area that is neither
a blighted area nor a conservation area, but where the municipality finds
redevelopment to be in the public interest, because the redevelopment will:
(a) Discourage commerce, industry, or manufacturing from moving their
operations to another state; or
(b) Result in increased employment in the municipality; or
(c) Result in preservation or enhancement of the tax base of the
municipality.115

In order to establish an Economic Development Area, a municipality must also
find that the subject property “will not be solely used for development of
commercial businesses which unfairly compete in the local economy.”116
2.

The But-For Test

The municipality, along with declaring the property as either a blighted
area, conservation area, or economic development area, must also issue
findings that “[t]he redevelopment area on the whole . . . has not been subject
to growth and development through investment by private enterprise and
would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without the adoption of
[the redevelopment plan].”117 This requirement is known generally as the butfor test (i.e., the property would not be developed but-for the tax increment
financing). The but-for test is a matter for both the developer and the
municipality to consider, and the financial documents contained in the
Redevelopment Plan should indicate the municipality’s but- for findings.118
IV. PROS AND CONS OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
TIF, as with most other business incentives, has both advantages and
disadvantages, depending upon the manner in which it is used. In its present
form, TIF mostly appeals to municipal government and development interests.
On the other hand, TIF is mainly criticized by economic and social policy
groups, as well as residents in communities using TIF, who question whether
or not TIF is necessary to spur additional development. The arguments both
for and against TIF will be presented in this section.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. § 99.805(5) (Supp. 1998).
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810(1).
Id. § 99.810(1) (Supp. 1998).
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Advantages of Tax Increment Financing
1.

Property “Recycling”

TIF allows for redevelopment of “problem” property tending toward decay
and obsolescence.119 The costs associated with redeveloping or rehabilitating
such property are generally greater than developing “green space,” due to the
demolition costs, environmental remediation expenses, and the need for
additional infrastructure associated with such projects.120 By subsidizing
development in areas of aging infrastructure, TIF provides a mechanism to
“level the playing field” through its simple yet powerful fiscal bootstrapping
technique.121 Moreover, this “recycling” of infrastructure and property, if
successful, also leads to beneficial secondary effects, such as the creation of
job opportunities and the enhancement of neighborhood sustainability, as well
as ultimately enhancing the municipality’s tax base, pending the retirement of
its bond obligations.122 Furthermore, such redevelopment will often stimulate
other nearby property development.123 Not surprisingly, municipalities often
cite these secondary effects as factors justifying the use of TIF.124
2.

Read My Lips: “No New Taxes”

In Missouri and other states, TIF provides a means of funding real estate
development projects without raising general taxes. Unlike other general tax
levies, with TIF, there is no need for the municipality to levy additional taxes
or request a public referendum on the use of TIF funds in conjunction with the
proposed redevelopment project. Instead, in place of taxes, the developer
makes payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs).125 This is not the case in several
other states, which subject TIF to the general restrictions imposed on tax
levies.126
119. CULOTTA, supra note 11, at 5.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
122. MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, supra note 74.
123. See id.
124. See Peddle, supra note 59, at 447.
125. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835(1). The issue of whether PILOTs are actually taxes was
litigated in Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n of Kan. City v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70
(Mo. 1989). Dunn argued in part that PILOTs are taxes and that article X, section 22(a) of the
Missouri Constitution “requires increases in government revenues and expenditures to be
approved by a vote of the people affected by the increase.” Id. at 74 (emphasis added). The
Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that “[t]he Constitution does not prohibit
a city from levying an existing tax without voter approval; instead, it prohibits a city from
increasing the current levy of an existing tax without voter approval.” Id.
126. Iowa, Arizona, South Dakota, Kentucky and Wisconsin have held that tax increment
financing is subject to constitutional debt limitations, thereby, at least in part subjecting TIF to
voter approval. See Goshorn, supra note 32, at 938-39.
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Strong Local Control

TIF allows for strong local control.127 While TIF is authorized by state
statute, the decision-making power with respect to TIF is in the hands of
individual municipalities.128 Municipalities may initiate the TIF project and
solicit developer proposals.
Alternatively, developers may approach
municipalities with a project suitable for TIF. In either case, municipalities
maintain the authority to examine the financial merits of each proposed
project, define the extent of the TIF, and oversee the developer’s efforts.129
4.

Flexibility

TIF also has built-in flexibility. It allows for reimbursement of a wide
range of costs of development.130 As noted earlier, TIF funds may be used for
the acquisition of land; demolition and removal of blighted structures;
installation, construction or reconstruction of streets, utilities or other site
improvements; restoration of properties of historic or architectural value; and
for the payment of miscellaneous costs.131 TIF employs several types of
financing schemes, including bond debt and pay-as-you-go arrangements.132
TIF may be initiated anytime a development opportunity arises. Also, TIF
may be used on both commercial and residential projects. Such flexibility
makes TIF highly attractive to developers engaged in a wide range of projects.
5.

Positive Fiscal Impacts

Finally, municipalities point to studies stating that TIF’s fiscal
bootstrapping technique is successful in raising assessed property values and
creating successful projects. For instance, a 1997 St. Louis Post-Dispatch
study found that TIF-subsidized projects almost always enlarge a city’s tax
base in the long run, with the assessed value of the TIF districts in Missouri
appreciating an average of seventy-five percent after the implementation and
completion of the TIF plan.133 However, recent data studies have reached
contradictory conclusions as to the value of TIF as an economic development
tool. For instance, one recent study by economists Richard F. Dye and David

127. See 1998 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 57, at 5.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., MID-AMERICA REGIONAL COUNCIL, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INCENTIVES: KANSAS CITY METROPOLITAN AREA 3 (1996) (on file with the Saint Louis
University Law Journal).
130. 2000 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 55, at 5.
131. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
133. Mihalopoulos, supra note 53. The Post-Dispatch study noted that as of April, 1997,
nearly $1 billion in private investment had accompanied $250 million in TIF-financed projects in
the St. Louis metro area. Id.
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F. Merriman showed that TIF ultimately produced a negative growth rate for
assessed property values.134
B.

Disadvantages of Tax Increment Financing

Regardless of the ultimate financial impacts, TIF is not universally lauded.
Taxing jurisdictions and public advocacy groups often oppose TIF as an
unnecessary “giveaway” to developers. Opponents also allege that TIF results
in substantial losses to traditional taxing jurisdictions, displacement of existing
businesses and residents, inefficient use of public resources, and “revenueshifting” that undermines the health of the regional economy.
1.

Inefficient Allocation of Resources

The primary argument against TIF is that it may result in inefficient
allocation of scarce resources.135 This is most apparent where the development
would have occurred without the subsidy. In other words, if the developer
obtained an excessive TIF subsidy, the taxing jurisdictions are wrongfully
deprived of the incremental revenue, and the developer excessively benefits
because the public ultimately absorbs the additional costs.136 When this
happens, TIF represents an inefficient use of market resources and may prevent
the dedication of such resources to other deserving projects.
2.

Effects on Traditional Taxing Jurisdictions

Critics also contend that traditional taxing jurisdictions often lose
substantial incremental property revenues to TIF, especially when multiple
large redevelopment projects are authorized within a single municipality.137
Studies have noted that large-scale TIF projects result in very long-term and
intensive tax commitments.138 Missouri, however, largely mitigates this TIF
danger by providing the school district with a voice on any TIF commission.139
Other states have vested taxing jurisdictions with even more power, by

134. Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on
Economic Development, 47 J. URB. ECON. 306, 307 (2000).
135. For a fuller exposition of this view, see Kenneth P. Thomas, Editorial, When Tax Help
Goes To Those Not In Need, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 1998, at B3. Professor
Thomas argues that economic efficiency is not served by TIF, or by other economic incentives.
Id.
136. Chapman, supra note 7, at 188.
137. WILCOX & VERSEL, supra note 38, at 16.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. By giving school boards and other
affected taxing jurisdictions representation on TIF commissions, the state provides a check on the
municipality. The affected taxing jurisdictions may voice their opinion as to the effects of the
TIF and ultimately vote on whether or not the TIF should be approved.
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allowing them to independently negotiate with the municipality in the
increment determination process.140
3.

Inter-municipal Bidding and Revenue-Shifting

Critics of TIF also argue that TIF encourages disadvantageous intermunicipality bidding wars for development dollars.141 These bidding wars, if
unchecked, can lead to adverse revenue-shifting effects that undermine the
health of the larger regional economy.142 Such inter-municipality bidding on
new development does not generate new wealth on its own, but shifts wealth
from one outlet to another.143 Concededly, revenue-shifting occurs to some
extent whenever a new provider enters the market. However, the effects of
revenue-shifting may be exacerbated by the use of subsidies such as TIF.144
The ultimate problem posed by this revenue-shifting effect is that, as one
commentator pointed out, TIF is not a “perpetual motion machine.”145 In other
words, TIF cannot sustain itself indefinitely. Each TIF project is ultimately not
“self-financing” because it relies on the larger economic marketplace to
generate the additional incremental tax revenue. Thus, TIF, if used sparingly
and judiciously, will increase property values and generate enough increment
to finance its own projects. However, if TIF is overused, the community will
experience diminishing marginal returns from its TIF-backed
redevelopment.146 Such diminishing returns will lead to two possible
outcomes. First, the diminishing returns may lead to a decline in the projected
increment, forcing smaller projects or cancellation of TIF projects. Second,
municipalities may overestimate the projected increment and then be forced to
default on their bond obligations when the increment is insufficient to cover
their bond debt.147

140. WILCOX & VERSEL, supra note 38, at 17. Other states, such as Kansas, are considering
whether to allow school districts the right to receive both present and future tax increments from
the proposed development, effectively removing the school district from the TIF equation. Id.
141. See Merrill Goozner, Governments Rethink Corporate Tax Breaks, CHI. TRIB., March
14,
2000,
at
http://www.chicago.tribune.com/news/printedition/article/0,2669,SAV0003140318,FF.html.
142. See Editorial, TIF Reform and Regional Growth, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, April 3,
2000, which states: “In our area, TIFs have done more harm than good. Instead of revitalizing
declining areas, they have hastened their decline by redirecting capital to richer areas.” Id.
143. 2000 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 55, at 5.
144. See Peddle, supra note 59, at 444.
145. Chapman, supra note 7, at 185.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 188. Certain states have acted to limit such “competitive retail outlet hunting.”
For instance, some states require the municipality to independently negotiate with the school
districts regarding the amount of the increment devoted to the redevelopment. Other states now
limit the amount of vacant land that can be included in a redevelopment project area. See
WILCOX & VERSEL, supra note 38, at 9.
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V. THE MISSOURI COURTS’ ACCEPTANCE OF THE BLIGHTING STANDARD
While TIF obviously has both strengths and weaknesses, it will almost
undoubtedly continue to be used by municipalities on a wide range of
development projects. This trend has been accepted by the Missouri courts,
which have consistently and uniformly held that Missouri’s TIF statute is
constitutional as written, and that the blighting and but-for tests are valid
restraints upon the municipal exercise of power.148 This trend recently reached
its zenith in JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres. However, prior
decisions, including decisions predating Missouri’s adoption of TIF, laid the
foundation for the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West. Thus, this section
provides a look at the most significant decisions in Missouri involving
municipal determinations of blight and but-for, starting with Tierney v.
Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kansas City and culminating with
JG St. Louis West.149
A.

Tierney v. Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kansas City150
1.

Historical Facts

In 1967 Missouri adopted section 100.310 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes, also known as the Planned Industrial Expansion Act, which allows
municipalities to acquire and redevelop land in “blighted,” “insanitary” or
“undeveloped” areas.151 The section 100.310 provisions are in many respects
substantially similar to TIF.152 Under the powers conferred by section
100.310, the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kansas City (PIEA),
sought to redevelop a twenty-two acre parcel of land in downtown Kansas
City.153 PIEA declared the parcel to be of a “blighted, insanitary or
undeveloped” condition and instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire
the land.154 The Tierneys, owners of a “structurally sound and useable”
property within the larger blighted parcel, opposed PIEA’s condemnation
proceedings on the grounds that their property did not fall into any of the three
statutory categories (blighted, insanitary or undeveloped).155 The Tierneys also
148. See infra notes 150-212 and accompanying text.
149. It should be noted that several of these cases do not directly involve TIF, but other
redevelopment statutes enacted in Missouri. However, these decisions are important in that they
involve determinations of “blight” and influence the court’s view of TIF in later cases such as JG
St. Louis West v. City of Des Peres.
150. 742 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
151. Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kan. City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 148-49.
152. See MO. REV. STAT. § 100.310 (1994).
153. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 149. Tierney’s property formed only a small part of a larger
“blighted” tract. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 151.
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objected to the municipality’s use of “economic underutilization” as a rationale
for its finding of blight.156 The Tierneys suggested that the court’s acceptance
of the concept of “economic underutilization” as a legitimate rationale for
redevelopment would result in municipalities acquiring virtually “unlimited
discretion” to determine where to pursue redevelopment.157
2.

Holding

The court noted that the Tierneys were not challenging the “basic concepts
underlying urban redevelopment,” but rather the application of section 100.310
to their “structurally sound and useable” property.158 Under this “as applied”
challenge to the municipal findings, the court accorded deference to the
legislative determinations of blight.159 Indeed, the court stated that, unless the
municipality’s decision was of an arbitrary or unreasonable nature,
determining “whether a particular area is blighted . . . is a matter for the
legislative body to resolve.”160 Moreover, the court held that “economic
underutilization” was a reasonable basis for a municipality to issue findings of
blight.161 The court stated that “[t]he concept of urban redevelopment has gone
far beyond slum clearance and the concept of economic underutilization is a
valid one.”162 Thus, the court would not sit as a “court of appeal over the
decision made by the municipal board,” but the “burden is on the owners to
show that the finding of blight constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of
the legislative authority.”163 The Tierneys failed to meet this burden.164
B.

Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In165
1.

Historical Facts

The Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals again considered the
extent of a municipality’s power to issue findings of blight in Crestwood
Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In.166 The case involved the

156. Id. Apparently, either in issuing the findings of blight or in prior conversations with the
plaintiff-owner, the municipality stated that the land was “economically underutilized” and
sought to use this as a basis for condemnation, although this was not specifically stated in the
opinion. Id.
157. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151.
158. Id. at 150.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 151.
162. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 812 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
166. Id.
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redevelopment of the 66 Drive-In movie theater into what was to be a
Schnuck’s supercenter grocery store.167 The Crestwood Board of Aldermen
determined that the 66 Drive-In site would be the ideal, if not the only, site
within the municipality that could accommodate the new store.168 The City,
acting under section 353, which, like TIF, requires a finding of blight,
therefore sought to condemn the Drive-In’s property.169
The City
commissioned studies finding that the property had “building, structures, and
land uses which, because of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded
design, or physical deterioration have resulted in economic and social liability
to the City and its residents . . . and may be found to be a blighted area.”170 The
Drive-In, however, desired to redevelop the property itself, and thus opposed
the condemnation and redevelopment under section 353.171 The City issued a
finding of blight and ultimately petitioned for condemnation of the Drive-In’s
property, despite 66 Drive-In’s opposition to the project.172
2.

Holding

The circuit court determined that Crestwood’s decision to declare the
Drive-In blighted was arbitrary and issued an injunction to stop the
condemnation proceedings. On appeal, however, the decision of the lower
court was reversed.173 As in Tierney, the court found that Crestwood, in
issuing its findings of blight, had acted in its “legislative capacity” and thus the
standard of judicial review was limited to whether the legislative determination
was “arbitrary” or induced by “fraud, collusion or bad faith.”174 Therefore, the
court accorded the City wide discretion in the “exercise of judgment in
determining a condition of blight in a given area.”175 Furthermore, the court
stated that it “could not substitute its opinion for that of the board unless it
appeared the board’s conclusion was clearly ‘arbitrary.’”176 In this case,

167. Id. at 905.
168. Id.
169. Id. MO. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) states: “[B]lighted area shall mean that portion of the
city within which the legislative authority of such city determines that by reason of age,
obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design or physical deterioration, have become economic
and social liabilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease,
crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes.”
170. Crestwood Commons, 812 S.W.2d at 905. Moreover, these conditions were such as to
be “conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes.”
Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 906-07.
173. Id. at 908.
174. Id. at 909.
175. Crestwood Commons, 812 S.W.2d at 909.
176. Id. Specifically, the court states that “there was room for reasonable differences and fair
debate on this issue. From the evidence, the Board reasonably could have concluded both that the
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because the evidence neither compelled a finding of “blight” nor did it compel
a conclusion to the contrary, the court held that the board reasonably could
have concluded that the area was blighted and in need of redevelopment.
Therefore, the Board’s decision was permitted to stand.177
C. Tax Increment Financing Commission of Kansas City v. J.E. Dunn
Construction Co.178
1.

Historical Facts

In 1986, Kansas City designated a 57,000 square foot parcel of property as
a “conservation area” under Missouri’s TIF statute.179
The City’s
Redevelopment Plan called for the rehabilitation of two existing buildings and
the construction of a new building for office and warehouse space.180 Dunn,
the owner of a useable 7500 square foot parcel of land within the
redevelopment project area, rejected the city’s initial buyout offer.181
Subsequently the city filed a petition to condemn the property under its power
of eminent domain.182 After the trial court ordered Dunn’s property
condemned, three condemnation commissioners awarded $55,000 to Dunn.183
Subsequently Dunn filed a motion to dismiss.
Dunn did not allege that the City Council had acted in an arbitrary or
fraudulent manner in finding that the property was a conservation area, but
rather Dunn challenged the constitutionality of the Real Property Tax
Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act.184 One argument Dunn raised was
area was blighted within the meaning of Section 353.020 and that a redevelopment plan was
necessary.” Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. 781 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
179. Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n of Kan. City v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70, 7478 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
180. Id. at 74.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d at 74. While Dunn argued that TIF was
unconstitutional, or more specifically, that TIF’s authorization of the redevelopment of
“conservation areas” was unconstitutional, this was not his main argument. Dunn’s primary
argument, which lies outside the scope of this Note, was that PILOTs, the incremental funds paid
by the property owners into the Special Allocation Fund, were taxes, and that the Missouri
Constitution requires such taxes to be approved by a vote of the people affected by the increase.
Id. The court rejected this argument, stating: “PILOTs are special assessments levied against the
property in the District for the improvements provided that property under a redevelopment plan.”
Id. at 77. In labeling the PILOTs as “special assessments” rather than new taxes, the bond
indebtedness did not violate the constitutional requirements. Id. This issue, as to whether
PILOTs are taxes, has already been addressed by other authors. See Goshorn, supra note 32, at
938. Goshorn questions the formalistic distinction made by the court between “special
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that the Missouri Constitution did not expressly allow for a municipality to
designate land as a “conservation area” under the TIF statute. Dunn argued
primarily from article VI, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution, which
provides that “laws may be enacted, and any city or county . . . may enact
ordinances . . . providing for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction,
redevelopment, and rehabilitation of blighted, substandard or insantarity
areas . . . and for the taking . . . by eminent domain, of property for such
purchases.”185 Noting that the constitution never expressly mentioned the
phrase “conservation area” as a legitimate area that could be found blighted,
Dunn contended that the powers of eminent domain did not apply to the taking
of property within such a designated area.186
2.

Holding

The court rejected Dunn’s constitutional interpretation argument.187
Rather, the court stated that the term “substandard,” as used in the constitution,
“speaks to a power given certain political subdivisions to prevent, as well as
eliminate, incipient conditions of blight.”188 Therefore, conservation areas,
which are areas “not yet blighted” but “detrimental to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare” could be legitimately categorized as “substandard” under
the constitution, and the designation of Dunn’s land as a “conservation area”
under the statute would not be deemed unconstitutional.189
D. City of St. Charles v. DeVault Management190
1.

Historical Facts

In 1993, the City of St. Charles, Missouri, attempted to establish a TIF
district for the redevelopment of 106 acres within its city limits.191 St. Charles
declared the area to be of a “blighted” condition.192 DeVault owned
apartments occupying eleven acres within the Redevelopment Plan
boundaries.193 When St. Charles instituted condemnation proceedings to
acquire possession of the property, DeVault Management and its owners

assessments” as opposed to “taxes” and has been questioned by various commentators.
Moreover, several other states, including Iowa and Wisconsin, have held that debt generated from
TIF is subject to constitutional debt limits. Id.
185. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d at 78.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. 959 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
191. City of St. Charles v. DeVault Mgmt., 959 S.W.2d. 815, 818 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 817-18.
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sought to dismiss the suit, alleging that St. Charles failed to plead sufficient
facts for eminent domain, to inform defendant of all relevant hearings, and to
adopt proper ordinances.194 DeVault’s primary contention was that the city’s
Redevelopment Plan, which called for the development of a hotel and
entertainment area, was not in conformity with its comprehensive plan, which
called for park land and moderate density residential use in the area of the
subject property.195
2.

Holding

In this case the court stated that St. Charles, as plaintiff seeking
condemnation of the DeVault property, bore the initial burden of proof of
showing compliance with the TIF statute.196 The court found that the city
failed to carry its burden of proof as it failed to prove that the Redevelopment
Plan “conforms to the comprehensive plan for the development of the
municipality as a whole” as required under section 99.810(2).197 The lack of
conformity, which was neither doubtful nor even fairly debatable, was thus
“arbitrary, contrary to fact, and an unwarranted abuse of discretion.”198 City of
St. Charles v. DeVault Management, therefore, provides some illumination of
what is required to prove that a municipality acted in an “arbitrary” manner in
making its determination of blight.
E.

JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres199
1.

Historical Facts

As was previously discussed, in 1997, Westfield America, hoping to attract
a Nordstrom’s department store to one of its Shoppingtowns, asked the City of
Des Peres to consider redeveloping West County Center with TIF funds.200
Des Peres agreed to negotiate with Westfield for the TIF funds, and over the
next two years undertook the requisite initial procedural steps of establishing a
TIF commission and hiring planning consultants to do preliminary financial

194. Id. at 818. Plaintiffs also contended lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief. Id.
195. DeVault Mgmt, 959 S.W.2d at 820. A city’s “comprehensive plan” is distinguished from
a “redevelopment plan.” The purpose of a comprehensive plan is to “guide the development and
use of land within the city.” Id. at 822.
196. Id. at 820.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. No. ED77037, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001).
200. JG St. Louis West L.L.C. v. City of Des Peres, No. ED77037, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2,
at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001). See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text for additional
background.
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analysis on West County Center.201 These consultants concluded that West
County Center could be declared blighted and met the but-for test.202
The West County Center Redevelopment Plan set forth five blighting
factors of the mall. First, the Plan stated that the shopping mall suffered from
“obsolete platting” due to its two-anchor configuration and limited amount of
space for small retail shops.203 Second, the mall was hindered by “improper
subdivision” due to irregularly platted lots constraining the ability of the mall
to grow.204 Third, “deteriorated site conditions” existed in the roof, utility
system and parapet wall.205 Fourth, deterioration of the mall’s water line could
potentially endanger mall property if there was a water main break during a
fire.206 Finally, the Plan found that the mall was an “economic liability” due to
the fact that the mall was experiencing declining sales and that the mall was
not keeping its value relative to neighboring, similarly situated, similarly-used
properties.207 Based on these findings, the Board unanimously passed four
ordinances which approved and adopted the Redevelopment Plan, authorized a
bond issue in the amount of $29.8 million, approved a site plan for the West
County Center redevelopment, and authorized Des Peres to enter into a
development agreement with Westfield.208 JG St. Louis West L.L.C., the
owner of a rival shopping mall in St. Louis, in conjunction with several
residents of Des Peres, filed suit against the city seeking to enjoin the use of
TIF on the project, and also seeking declaratory judgment invalidating the four
TIF ordinances.209
2.

Holding

Adapting the earlier tests of Tierney and Crestwood Commons
Redevelopment Corp., the court found that the Des Peres Board of Alderman
had the power to declare the mall blighted so long as there was no showing that
they acted in an arbitrary or fraudulent manner in making that decision.210
Absent such evidence of fraud, the court would not challenge the
municipality’s “fairly debatable” determination that the mall was blighted.211
Moreover, the court held that plaintiffs also failed to produce evidence that the
mall could be redeveloped without the use of TIF; therefore, plaintiffs also

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *8.
Id.
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failed to carry their burden in regards to the municipality’s application of the
but-for test.212
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Principles of Statutory Construction
Missouri courts apply generally accepted principles of statutory
construction.213 Thus, when interpreting a statute, Missouri courts determine
the intent of the statute from the language of the statute itself, as far as is
possible.214 Indeed, the words considered are given their “plain and ordinary
meaning” unless they conflict with a “ascertained legislative intent.”215 Where
a statute is ambiguous, the court will “attempt to construe it in a manner
consistent with the legislative intent, giving meaning to the words used within
the broad context of the legislature’s purpose in enacting the law.”216 These
principles of statutory construction have dictated the court’s expansive
interpretation of blight in Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation
Redevelopment Act.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, blight has multiple
definitions.217 Most generally, blight is considered to be “any malignant
influence of obscure or mysterious origin; anything which withers hope or
prospects, or checks prosperity.”218 In its verb form, blighting can mean “to
exert a baleful influence on” or “to destroy the brightness, beauty, or promise
of,” or even “to nip in the bud, mar, [or] frustrate.”219
In relation to cities, however, blight takes on somewhat different
connotations. Most generally, blight could be described as any “unaesthetic or
uneconomic section; an area of such kind that razing all the buildings will
serve a public purpose, even though a few of them may not be substandard or
blighted.”220 More specifically, blighted areas are those “marked by

212. Id. at *13.
213. See Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. 1993).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1961).
218. Id. Blight, in relation to plants, is defined as “any baleful influence of atmospheric or
invisible origin, that suddenly blasts, nips, or destroys plants, affects them with disease, arrests
their growth, or prevents their blossom from ‘setting’; a diseased state of plants of unknown or
assumed atmospheric origin.” Id.
219. Id.
220. Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, What Constitutes a “Blighted Area” Within Urban
Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes, 45 A.L.R. 3d 1096 (1972).
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termination of healthy growth and development accompanied by deterioration
and decline of property values.”221
While incorporating elements of these definitions, Missouri’s Real
Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act does not define blight
in these specific terms. Rather, the statute identifies blight as “an economic or
social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its
present condition and use.”222 Several “factors” are identified to indicate the
existence of this “economic or social liability,” including: (1) defective or
inadequate street layout, (2) unsanitary or unsafe conditions, (3) deterioration
of site improvements, (4) improper subdivision or obsolete platting, (5) the
existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire or other causes,
or (6) any “combination of such factors.”223
Once a municipality makes the determination that the subject property is
blighted (i.e., that the property suffers from “obsolete platting,” “improper
subdivision,” “deteriorated site conditions” or the like) the Missouri courts,
constrained by the rules of statutory construction, must abide by that municipal
determination so long as there is at least some evidence that the blighting
factors exist. In other words, so long as there is a modicum of evidence of
improper subdivision or obsolete platting or any of the other blighting factors,
the court will not question the fairly debatable determination made by the
municipality.224 Any evidence of high surrounding poverty rate, or crime
rates, or abandoned structure, while not necessary to establish blight, will help
cement the municipality’s blighting declaration.225
The end result is that Missouri municipalities are afforded a presumption
of validity in making their determinations of blight, so long as they have some
evidence of blight as dictated by the statute’s list of blighting factors.226

221. Id.
222. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (Supp. 1998).
223. Id. at § 99.805(3). Similarly, to be declared a “conservation area,” some combination of
the following factors must be in existence: 1) deterioration; 2) illegal use of individual structures;
3) presence of structures below minimum code standards; 4) abandonment; 5) excessive
vacancies; 6) overcrowding of structures and community facilities; 7) lack of ventilation, light or
sanitary facilities; 8) inadequate utilities; 9) excessive land coverage; 10) deleterious land use or
layout; 11) depreciation of physical maintenance; 12) the lack of community planning. Id. at §
99.805(3). Logically, municipalities seeking to utilize TIF rely on this very statutory language in
making their determinations of blight. For instance, in the West County Center situation, Des
Peres determined that the mall was blighted due to “obsolete platting,” “improper subdivision,”
“deteriorated site conditions,” and the “existence of conditions which could endanger life or
property.” See supra notes 203-209 and accompanying text.
224. One author, having reviewed “probably fifty TIF qualification studies,” stated that he
“had yet to see more than a perfunctory treatment of the blighting factors and but-for criterion.”
Peddle, supra note 59, at 449.
225. See Peddle, supra note 59, at 448.
226. See JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *11.
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Obsolete platting, deterioration of infrastructure, declining sales figures,
declining property values, increasing maintenance costs—the existence of any
combination of factors forms evidence sufficient for the municipality to reach
its conclusion that the subject area is blighted.227 If such evidence is available
to the municipality, the Board’s decision is deemed “fairly debatable” and the
court will not scrutinize it, absent a showing of fraud or abuse.228
Similarly, where municipalities provide at least a modicum of evidence
that the development would not occur without the subsidy, Missouri courts will
not interfere with the municipality’s determination that the but-for test is met.
Thus, to satisfy the but-for test, the municipality must supply financial analysis
of the redevelopment project showing a gap between the expected costs of the
project and the projected value.229 Alternatively, the municipality may also
show a consistent pattern of previous but unsuccessful redevelopment efforts
as evidence that the requirement is fulfilled.230 But so long as the municipality
presents some evidence to justify its findings, its but-for declaration will be
shielded from judicial scrutiny.
The main burden placed upon municipalities seeking to meet the blighting
and but-for test, is thus one of fact-finding and due diligence.231 To be
afforded the presumption of validity, the municipality must perform studies,
engage expert urban planners, and complete the requisite financial analysis
regarding the subject property. As one author stated: “[F]or a determination of
blight to survive scrutiny by trial and appellate courts, the determination must
be supported by substantial evidence directly apposite to the state requirements
in the relevant statutory definition of blight.”232
This presumption of validity, however, imposes a high barrier on a plaintiff
seeking to enjoin a municipality’s decision to use TIF. Indeed, the plaintiff

227. Id. at *10. Of course, it may be the case that all real estate has increasing maintenance
costs over time, or “tends toward obsolesce.”
228. Id. at *9.
229. However, some municipalities fail to include financial analysis in their “but-for”
findings. One author describes this as the municipality using their “administrative fiat” to meet
the but-for test. Peddle, supra note 59, at 449.
230. Id. at 444.
231. See, e.g., Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case
Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 476 (2000).
232. Id. He also notes that “the quality of the evidence is important” and should consist of
photographs, records of police, fire, public health, welfare, and taxing agency, and maps of the
proposed blighted areas. Id. Thus, it is apparent why in the West County Center situation, the
Des Peres Board of Aldermen “consulted a wide variety of independent information sources,
including field investigations, records from local sources, interviews with local officials, and
other independent studies.” JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *8. Such
information, served as a mandate for the board’s ultimate findings that the blighting and but-for
tests were met, and ultimately served to shield the board’s decision from judicial scrutiny in the
case brought against the city.
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would have to show that there was some evidence of fraud or misdealing, or
that the finding of blight is “so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to an
abuse of the legislative process.”233 In large part this accounts for the
decisions being decided against plaintiffs challenging a municipal
determination of blight in TIF and similar non-TIF cases.234 Evidence of fraud
or misdealing, however, is exceedingly difficult to produce. Plaintiffs are thus
left with little recourse when seeking to overturn municipal decisions to use
TIF.
B.

Policy Issues

Besides the principles of statutory construction, several policy issues have
also influenced the stance of the courts towards the blighting and but-for tests
of Missouri’s TIF statute. First, the courts recognize that the redevelopment of
“blighted, substandard, or insanitary” areas serves a public purpose.235
Secondly, municipal determinations of blight are deemed to be legislative
findings not in the realm of judicial review. Finally, the courts believe that the
municipalities are in the best position to determine what is and is not blight,
and, moreover, the courts imply that the electoral process serves a proper
check on municipal government boards making determinations of blight for the
purpose of TIF redevelopment.
Missouri courts hold that the redevelopment of “blighted, substandard, or
insanitary” areas is a public purpose.236 This principle is embodied in the
Missouri Constitution, which states that “laws may be enacted . . . providing
for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, redevelopment, and rehabilitation
of blighted, substandard, or insanitary areas . . . as may be deemed in the
public interest.”237 Moreover, a long and unbroken line of cases has also
supported the conclusion that property redevelopment serves a “public
purpose.” As early as 1954, in State ex rel Dalton v. Land Clearance for
Redevelopment Authority,238 the Missouri Supreme Court stated: “A legislative
finding . . . that a blighted or insanitary area exists and that the legislative
agency proposes to take the property therein under the processes of eminent
domain for the purpose of clearance and improvement . . . as it may deem in
the public interest will be accepted by the courts as conclusive evidence that
the contemplated use thereof is public.”239

233. See Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150.
234. See supra notes 151-212 and accompanying text.
235. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 150.
236. Id.
237. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
238. 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954) (en banc).
239. State ex rel Dalton v. Land Clearance For Redevelopment Auth. of Kan. City, 270
S.W.2d 44, 52 (Mo. 1954) (en banc).
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Second, the courts have long held that decisions made at the local level are
legislative determinations that generally fall outside of the scope of judicial
review. While municipalities do not have “inherent” legislative powers, the
Missouri General Assembly, which has plenary powers under article III,
section I of the Missouri Constitution, may grant municipalities certain
legislative powers, so long as these powers are within constitutional limits.240
Under Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Act, municipalities
acquired certain powers to make legislative determinations as to what
constitutes “blighted property.”241 The court will thus afford deference to such
municipal “legislative” determinations, to the extent that there is no showing
that the determination was tainted by fraud or misdealing.242
Finally, the courts believe that municipalities are in the best position to
determine what areas within its borders are blighted. In other words, the courts
recognize the municipal governing boards’ expertise as to matters of municipal
governance—or at the very least, heightened knowledge—and judges (or
juries) are ill-equipped to review such judgments.243 Therefore, the court will
not substitute its authority for the municipality’s unless the municipality’s
decision is shown to be “arbitrary or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith or
whether the board exceeded its powers.”244
C. Critique and Proposal
While the court’s decision in JG St. Louis West is supported by longstanding principles of statutory construction and public policy, the decision
handed down in JG St. Louis West fails in that it does not take into account
common-sense notions of blight. In other words, the court’s semantic
manipulation of the term “blight” ignores an underlying reality that many of
the controversial TIF projects in Missouri are not, by common-sense standards,
blighted. Thus, the TIF blighting test is made at best illogical and at worse
meaningless by the court’s statutory construction of the term.
Similarly, the but-for standard has proven to be more elusive than helpful.
Commentators have often pointed out that it is nearly impossible to predict

240. See City of Kansas City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
241. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.
242. See JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *3.
243. This logic is similar to the protection afforded by the business judgment rule in corporate
law. Simply stated, the business judgment rule holds that corporate directors should not be held
liable for business actions made in good faith, even if other boards would have reached an
opposite conclusion. Kenneth B. Davis, Once More, The Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 573, 573 (2000). One rationale for the courts’ application of the business judgment rule is
that business judgments are best left to business experts, i.e., corporate directors. Id. at 580.
244. JG St. Louis West, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2, at *3.
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what amount of development would actually have occurred but-for the TIF.245
Thus, municipalities cannot conclusively document that the project would not
happen but-for the subsidy. Rather, they are forced to rely on pledges from the
developer that the but-for test is met. Likewise, plaintiffs seeking to challenge
a but-for determination have almost no hope of producing the documentary
evidence required to show that the project would occur but-for the subsidy.
In other words, these two tests, originally intended to supply adequate
justification for government intervention in private markets, have failed to
provide meaningful boundaries to when and where TIF should be utilized. The
tests are simply too subjective to afford the adequate accountability necessary
to ensure the proper use of public money.246 As a result, the public is often
outraged by the municipal use of TIF funds.
In light of the dissonance between common-sense definitions of blight and
the current statutory definition of blight, as well as the difficulties with proving
the but-for test, options for reform should be carefully considered.247 Indeed,
the legislature has considered reforming TIF several times. These proposals
have focused on limiting TIF to deteriorating, inner-city areas. However, such
proposals have failed to garner the requisite majority of lawmakers, in part
because they would limit TIF to only the most deteriorated areas within the
state.248
In light of the current legislative impasse, there are at least two additional
possible avenue of TIF reform for the legislature to consider. First, the
legislature could completely remove the blighting and but-for tests from the
Missouri statute.249 Dropping the but-for test and blighting tests would result
245. Chapman, supra note 7, at 188. Often, in fact, there is a give-and-take process of
negotiation between the municipalities and the developers, which indicates the variability of the
necessity of the public subsidy. For instance, in a TIF project that was supposed to occur in
Olivette, Missouri, the developers initially stated that $41 million in TIF was necessary to finance
the project. Dan Mihalopoulos, Olivette Mulls $39.5 Million Subsidy for Plaza Report on
Shopping Center, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, April 12, 1999 (West Post), at A1. The city
however, had sent a letter to the homeowners stating that they did not want to give more than $35
million in TIF to the project. The developer relented, and was prepared to perform the
redevelopment for $35 million (indicating that the “but for” test was not absolute, but was open to
negotiation.
246. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
COSTS, BENEFITS, AND OVERALL IMPACTS OF THE STATE OF OHIO’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS 24 (1999) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT]. The contents of this report do not reflect the views of the State of Ohio or a consensus
of the Economic Development Study Advisory Committee.
247. Most proposals for reform have attempted to limit TIF to areas of “pervasive poverty” or
high unemployment.
248. See Eric Stern, State Legislators Debate Measure to Restrict TIFs, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 9, 2000, at B1.
249. Of course, TIF would remain subject to the procedural tests discussed earlier in supra
notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
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in no more TIF plans being adopted by municipalities than are adopted under
the current system—in large part because the municipality has built-in, welldefined procedural checks that limit the use of TIF.250 However, in dropping
these tests, the municipality (and, ultimately, the courts) would be freed from
being forced to make irrational declarations of blight that do not correspond to
common-sense notions of the term.
Alternatively, the blighting and but-for tests could be discarded in favor of
a more realistic, intuitive test. Such a test would recognize that TIF is no
longer a limited-purpose development tool, but rather has evolved into a
general-purpose economic development engine. For example, the Missouri
legislature could revise the Missouri Real Property Tax Increment Allocation
Act to allow TIF to be utilized by municipalities based on one of the following
eight justifications:
1.

Occurrence of a private market failure;

2.

Problem created by an unintended government policy impact;

3.

Occurrence of a sudden and severe economic dislocation;

4.

Presence of structural barriers impeding the economic advance of certain
population groups (minorities, disadvantaged populations, etc.);

5.

Presence of a serious competitive disadvantage impeding economic
development;

6.

Situation that threatens an established or emerging industry that is
strategically important to state or local economic vitality;

7.

Opportunity exists that offers the potential to produce an overwhelming
positive public benefit; or

8.

Situation exists to stimulate valuable and significant
intergovernmental, or public-private cooperation and benefit.251

regional,

This test, being considered currently by the State of Ohio, would provide
more logical justifications for the municipal use of TIF, but would not limit
TIF to certain municipalities based on arbitrary economic criteria. There is,
however, one major problem with discarding the blighting and but-for tests.
The intent of these tests, at the time they were instituted, was to ensure that TIF
would be used in urban areas of the greatest need. Therefore, any changes to
the TIF statute should take into account the needs of these communities.
Perhaps, as some critics have suggested, a “Super TIF” arrangement could be

250. These checks include representation on TIF commissions by the affected school boards,
taxing districts and (at times) the county. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
251. These justifications were suggested in the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 246, at 24.
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instituted for these communities, allowing them to tap into some form of state
matching funds for TIF projects in truly needy areas.252 Such a Super TIF
would, in theory, stimulate additional development in the most needy areas,
including urban areas and inner-ring suburbs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ockham’s Razor is the philosophical principle that the simplest solution to
a problem is often the best one.253 The simplest solution—and perhaps the best
solution—for the problems associated with TIF would be to discard the
blighting and but-for tests, and possibly replace these tests with a more
workable, intuitive standard. At the very least, through such changes TIF
would be properly aligned with its broad present-day uses. Secondly, such
changes should spur the legislature to look more closely at areas which TIF
was intended to help but failed to reach. In taking these steps, the legislature
would address most, if not all, of the concerns connected with tax increment
financing in Missouri.
JOSH REINERT*

252. 1998 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 57, at 4. Kansas City allows for a “super TIF”
program described as follows: “Under a normal TIF plan, 50 percent of the local economic
activity taxes increment is available to reimburse eligible costs. Under Super TIF, all of [the]
economic activity taxes are made available.” Id.
253. More precisely, Ockham’s Razor stands for the proposition that “terms, concepts, and
assumptions must not be multiplied beyond necessity.” NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 876
(10th ed. 1997).
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